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PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS AND
ABSTENTION: SOME PROBLEMS
IN FEDERALISM
Michael Wellst
Suppose a federal district court faces a challenge to state action
that presents an unsettled issue of state law, a federal constitutional
issue, and a plaintiff who will be irreparably harmed if the state is
not immediately enjoined. May the court abstain from a decision
on the merits, remand the case to the state courts for resolution of
the state law issue, and yet grant a preliminary injunction against
the challenged state action? Does it follow from the paucity of
reported opinions coupling such interim relief with abstention,
that such a procedure is inconsistent with the policies underlying
the abstention doctrine?2 Should we rely on the state courts to
decide the interim relief question? Are there practical considera-
tions that favor other methods for resolving the interests of the
plaintiff, the state, and the federal system? This Article examines
these questions and suggests that more extensive use of prelimi-
nary relief would not unduly interfere with the purposes of absten-
tion, would help accommodate all the interests at stake in an ab-
stention case, and may be the best available means for serving the
goals of abstention.
t Member, District of Columbia and Virginia Bars. B.A. 1972, J.D. 1975, University of
Virginia. The author wishes to thank John C. McCoid, J. Harvie Wilkinson III, and John
D. Eure for their helpful comments on earlier drafts.
I See Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220 (1957); Catrone v. Mas-
sachusetts State Racing Comm'n, 535 F.2d 669 (1st Cir. 1976); Reed v. Board of Election
Comm'rs, 459 F.2d 121 (1st Cir. 1972); Silverman v. Browning, 359 F. Supp. 173 (D.
Conn. 1972), aff'd mere., 411 U.S. 941 (1973); Burks v. Perk, 339 F. Supp. 1194 (N.D.
Ohio), rev'd, 470 F.2d 163 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 905 (1973); Maier v. Good,
325 F. Supp. 1268 (N.D.N.Y. 1971); Alexander v. Thompson, 313 F. Supp. 1389 (C.D.
Cal. 1970); Sherwood v. Bradford, 246 F. Supp. 550 (S.D. Cal. 1965); cf. Glenwal Dev.
Corp. v. Schmidt, 336 F. Supp. 1079 (D.P.R. 1972) (preliminary injunction granted despite
failure to exhaust administrative remedies, when plaintiff's constitutional rights had been
violated).
2 In this Article the term abstention means the reference of a federal case to the state
court for resolution of state law issues, in the hope that a federal constitutional issue will be
avoided. Courts sometimes use the term to refer to other situations where the federal court
declines to exercise its jurisdiction. See Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of
the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1071, 1147 (1974). In Professor Field's
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I
ABSTENTION
Abstention is one of several doctrines designed to minimize
the conflicts created by the existence of state and federal courts
within our federal systemA State sovereignty over local matters
allows more efficient and responsive government.4 At the same
time, Congress has recognized the need for a system of federal
courts to interpret federal law uniformly and to protect federally
created rights. 5 In addition, the Supreme Court has said that the
federal courts bear the primary responsibility for deciding federal
questions.6
Often, however, courts confront cases that present both state
and federal issues. In such cases, courts must sometimes decide
legal questions on which they cannot rule authoritatively. Mistaken
interpretations of federal law by state courts can be corrected by
Supreme Court review,7 but a federal court's exegesis of state law
cannot be reviewed by a state court.8 A major problem arises when
terminology, this Article is about Pullman abstention, so named because the doctrine was
first fully articulated in Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). See generally
P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 985-1005 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART &
WECHSLER]; C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS §§ 52-52A (3d ed. 1976); Bezanson,
Abstention: The Supreme Court and Allocation of Judicial Power, 27 VAND. L. REv. 1107 (1974);
Liebenthal, A Dialogue on England: The England Case, Its Effect on the Abstention Doctrine, and
Some Suggested Solutions, 18 W. REs. L. REV. 157 (1966); Note, Federal-Question Abstention:
Justice Frankfurter's Doctrine in an Activist Era, 80 HARV. L. REV. 604 (1967).
This Article is not another analysis of the abstention doctrine. It is a discussion of the
relationship between abstention and interim relief and draws heavily on the existing litera-
ture in its discussion of abstention.
3 See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). Other such devices include re-
quirements that litigants exhaust state remedies before going to federal court and the doc-
trine that federal courts generally will not interfere in state criminal prosecutions. See gen-
erally Note, Younger Grows Older: Equitable Abstention in Civil Proceedings, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV.
870, 895 (1975).
1 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). For a full exposition of the values of
federalism, see Wilkinson,Justice John M. Harlan and the Values of Federalism, 57 VA. L. REV.
1185 (1971).
'See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (federal question jurisdiction).
6 See Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 509-10 (1972); Zwickler v.
Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 247-52 (1967); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 672-74
(1963). See generally Field, supra note 2, at 1080-84; Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the
District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 158-59 (1953).
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1257-1258 (1970); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304
(1816).
' An injunction, however, can be modified or lifted when the state court rules au-
INJUNCTIONS AND ABSTENTION
the federal court faces both an unsettled issue of state law and a
difficult question of federal constitutional law. 9 Federal courts do
not decide constitutional questions unnecessarily.' 0 If the federal
court incorrectly decides the state law issue," the court may decide
a constitutional issue when it need not do so. In these difficult
cases, the Supreme Court has held that the district courts should
abstain from immediate decision on the merits; the court should
instead remand the case to the state courts for authoritative resolu-
tion of the state law issues,' 2 while retaining jurisdiction of the
controversy.' 3 After the state court has ruled, the parties may re-
turn to the federal court for adjudication of the federal issues.' 4
II
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS
AND THE GOALS OF ABSTENTION
Abstention serves a number of state and federal interests. By
abstaining, the federal court allows state courts to decide state law
issues, avoids unnecessary constitutional adjudication, minimizes
federal interference with state programs, and shows respect for
state courts. Interim relief sometimes conflicts with these policies,
but not as much as a failure to abstain.
thoritatively. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5); Lee v. Bickell, 292 U.S. 415, 425-26 (1934); Glenn
v. Field Packing Co., 290 U.S. 177, 179 (1933). See generally Note, Finality of Equity Decrees
in the Light of Subsequent Events, 59 HARV. L. REv. 957, 963-66 (1946); Comment, Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b): Standards For Relief from Judgments Due to Change in Law, 43 U.
CHi. L. REv. 646 (1976); Comment, Pierce v. Cook & Co.: Change in State Law as a Ground
for Relief From a Federal Judgment, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 843 (1976); 62 VA. L. REv. 414, 421
n.45 (1976).
9 Two recent commentators have suggested that the presence of a federal constitu-
tional question should not be considered a prerequisite to abstention. Bezanson, supra note
2, at 1112; Field, supra note 2, at 1136-38.
10 See Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 510 (1972); Railroad Comm'n
v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 498 (1941); Siler v. Louisville & N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 193
(1909); cf. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 345-48 (1936) (concurring opinion, Brandeis,
J.) (rules developed by Supreme Court to avoid decision of constitutional issues).
11 Before Pullman, the Supreme Court had suggested that the district court should try
to avoid the constitutional issue by deciding the state law issue first. See Cincinnati v. Ves-
ter, 281 U.S. 439, 488-89 (1930); Field, supra note 2, at 1077 & n.20.
12 E.g., Harris County Comm'rs Ct. v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 83 (1975); Railroad
Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 498 (1941).
13 American Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. New Jersey Sup. Ct., 409 U.S. 467 (1973) (per
curiam).
14 England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
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A. Avoidance of Constitutional Decisionmaking
The principle that federal courts should avoid constitutional
adjudication 15 is rooted in the inherent conflict between the prin-
ciples of judicial review and popular sovereignty: courts wish to
avoid invalidating laws passed by democratically elected represent-
atives. In order to minimize conflict between the legislative and
judicial branches, and avoid public dissatisfaction with the courts
which could result from too frequent application of the power of
judicial review, courts try to avoid deciding cases on constitutional
grounds.' 6 The presence in an abstention case of an unsettled and
possibly dispositive state law issue and a constitutional issue natu-
rally suggests that the decision should, if possible, rest on state law
grounds.
Interim relief may conflict with this policy, for a grant of such
relief rests in part on a judicial evaluation of the merits of the
plaintiff's case. Of course, courts also weigh the hardship to the
plaintiff if relief is denied, compare this hardship to the plaintiff
with the defendant's hardship if relief is granted, and evaluate the
effect of relief on the public interest.?7 Preliminary rulings do not
bind the court when it decides the merits.' 8 But to the extent that
even a tentative constitutional judgment interferes with the opera-
tion of a state program, the policy against overturning state legisla-
tion on constitutional grounds seems to be abrogated. The harm,
however, is not so great as when a court refuses to abstain. The
decision is preliminary and may ultimately be changed. Moreover,
the state issue may be decided in a manner that eliminates the need
for a final constitutional ruling.' 9
B. State Courts Deciding Issues of State Law
A more significant objection to preliminary constitutional rul-
ings is that they may harm the federalism interest in having state
15 See cases cited in note 10 supra.
16 See generally A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 111-33 (1962).
"See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975); Banks v. Trainor, 525 F.2d
837, 841 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 978 (1976); 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2948, at 430-31 (1973); Nussbaum, Tenporary Restraining
Orders and Prelininary Injunctions-The Federal Practice, 26 Sw. L.J. 265, 273 (1972).
1 See Industrial Bank v. Tobriner, 405 F.2d 1321, 1323-24 (D.C. Cir. 1968). See gener-
ally Nussbaum, supra note 17, at 278.
,1 Interference with existing state policy-not violation of the rule prohibiting un-
necessary constitutional inquiry-presents the more serious problem resulting from con-
stitutional review of state programs. The relation of interim relief to interference with state
programs is discussed in the text accompanying notes 30-34 infra.
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courts decide state law issues.2 ° State courts should decide ques-
tions of state law because they are sovereign over state law.2' They
are likely to be more sensitive to the purposes underlying state
law; 22 they are more familiar with the evolution of state law issues;
and they, more than the federal courts, will have to deal with the
effects of precedent they create.
When a federal court grants interim relief based on the prob-
ability of the plaintiff's ultimate success on a constitutional claim,
and perhaps even when relief is based on the probability of success
on a state law cause of action,23 the state court may well take these
preliminary determinations as an indication of how the federal
court will ultimately rule on the merits. The preliminary ruling
might be perceived by the state court as an attempt to force it to
decide state law questions in accordance with the federal court's
intimations, or risk having the federal court hold the state law
unconstitutional.24 Whether this effect is intended or not, it seems
inconsistent with the principle that state courts should decide issues
of state law.25 The circumstances under which the determination is
made exacerbate the harm. Since the ruling is only preliminary,
the federal court need not fully articulate the principles on which
its ruling rests; consequently, the federal court's preliminary deci-
sion may be poorly reasoned and unduly ambiguous. Since it is
necessarily based on a hurried examination of the issues, the fed-
eral court may reach a wrong result; a state court may then distort
its interpretation of state law to conform to this initially incorrect
decision.
These objections should be considered whenever interim relief
is at issue and preliminary determinations of law must be made,
but they need not bar relief in all cases. The decision to issue a
preliminary injunction rests in the sound discretion of the trial
20 The principle is expressed in many Supreme Court opinions, some of which are
collected in Field, supra note 2, at 1084 n.53.
21 See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 (1938).
22 See generally Bezanson, supra note 2, at 1116; Field, supra note 2, at 1117-18.
2 3 E.g., Alexander v. Thompson, 313 F. Supp. 1389, 1398-99 (C.D. Cal. 1970); cf. Ca-
trone v. Massachusetts State Racing Comm'n, 535 F.2d 669, 672 (1st Cir. 1976) (remanding
case with directions to abstain from deciding state law question but allowing preliminary
injunctive relief).
24 Cf. United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 396 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1965) (federal
court retention of jurisdiction rendered state court judgment an advisory opinion, in viola-
tion ofjudicial function).
25 At the same time, a plaintiff is required to tell the state court of his federal claims,
so that the court can construe state law in light of those claims. See Government Employees
v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364, 366 (1957).
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court, with all relevant factors balanced in arriving at the de-
cision.2 6 If the hardship to the plaintiff absent relief would be
substantial and the harm to the defendant minimal, courts may
grant interim relief without determining the likelihood of the
plaintiff's success on the merits, as long as the plaintiff has raised
substantial questions presenting fair grounds for litigation.27
In many abstention cases it is not necessary for courts to make
a tentative decision on the merits. 28 For instance, a plaintiff may
attack a state statute that prevents him from doing something im-
portant to him-voting, using his land as he wants, exhibiting a
motion picture-in a case presenting difficult legal issues. If the
case involves only a few plaintiffs who attack the statute only as
applied to them, a preliminary injunction will have limited impact
on the state's ability to enforce its law. Moreover, an injunction may
be limited to the plaintiff even when the statute is attacked on its
face.29 If the plaintiff would be greatly harmed in the absence of
an injunction and if the state is required only to make a narrow
and temporary exception to its legislative policy rather than aban-
don it completely, the balance of hardships may weigh so heavily in
the plaintiff's favor that no preliminary determination on the
merits need be made.
C. Avoidance of Unnecessary Interference with State Programs
When a federal court invalidates a state program on state law
grounds, but would uphold the program against constitutional
26 Banks v. Trainor, 525 F.2d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 978
(1976); 0. Fiss, INJUNCTIONS 168 (1973). But see Canal Auth. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567,
572 (5th Cir. 1974) (four factors termed "prerequisites"); Jones v. National Collegiate Ath-
letic Ass'n, 392 F. Supp. 295, 298 (D. Mass. 1975) (probable success treated as a prerequi-
site). Also noteworthy is Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975), in which the
Supreme Court suggested that a plaintiff wishing to enjoin criminal proceedings must
show irreparable harm and probability of success.21 E.g., William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 526 F.2d 86,
88 (9th Cir. 1975); Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197, 1205-06 (2d
Cir. 1970), noted in 71 CoLUM. L. REv. 165 (1971); Smoake v. Fritz, 320 F. Supp. 609, 612
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 787 (D.R.I. 1970). See gener-
ally 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 17, § 2948, at 453-54.28 E.g., Manard v. Miller, 53 F.R.D. 610 (E.D. Va. 1971); Smoake v. Fritz, 320 F. Supp.
609 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
9 Cf. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975) (dictum) (preliminary injunc-
tion against state prosecutions during pendency of declaratory judgment action would
operate solely for plaintiffs' benefit). The question whether final injunctive relief should
be granted only to the plaintiff, or against any enforcement of a statute, is unsettled. See
0. Fiss, INJUNCTIONS 484-88, 499-504 (1972); Field, supra note 2, at 1094 n.89.
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challenge, and state courts later uphold the program under state
law, the federal court has unnecessarily interfered with the state
program. Here, abstention would have made the interference
unnecessary. 30 Preliminary relief also interferes with a state pro-
gram before the resolution of any legal issues. If the state ulti-
mately prevails on the merits, the relief is unnecessary in the sense
that the plaintiff never had a legal right to it.
Although the effects of granting interim relief and refusing to
abstain are somewhat similar, the two situations are different in
important ways. First, granting interim relief causes a less serious
disruption of state programs than does a refusal to abstain. There
should be only a short time between preliminary relief and disposi-
tion on the merits. The length of the delay is largely in the hands
of the state courts, to whom the issue of state law will have been
referred and who presumably are sensitive to the harm caused the
state by delay. When a court refuses to abstain, invalidates state
action on state law grounds, and is upheld on appeal, the state
must bring a new suit in state court in order to overturn the
judgment.31
Second, granting preliminary relief does not require a judg-
ment on the merits of a state law claim. If the federal court refuses
to abstain and decides the case, state officials and citizens are likely
to conform their conduct to the federal court's decision. In con-
trast, because interim relief involves no binding decision on the
merits, state officials and citizens unaffected by the decree need
not alter their actions to conform to the court's order.32
Third, the comparative harm to the plaintiff and to the defen-
dant must be balanced in deciding whether to grant preliminary
relief.33 If the harm to the state defendant would be great, interim
relief can be denied even if the plaintiff's harm is also great. In
contrast, final relief cannot be denied a plaintiff who has proven
his case on the merits.34
30 See Field, supra note 2, at 1090 n.80.
"I There may be circumstances when no state suit can be brought. See Field, supra note
2, at 1094 n.89.
32 Cf. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975) (injunctive relief affected
only federal plaintiffs involved; state remained free to prosecute others who violate chal-
lenged statute).
33 See text accompanying note 17 supra.
34 The decree can be shaped to take account of state interests, however. See Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586-87 (1964); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v.
Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 767-70 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Bezanson, supra note 2, at 1113
n.35.
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D. Respect for State Courts
Abstention also serves the policy of showing respect for the
state courts' ability to decide claims capably and fairly.35 But the
policy is more easily stated than explained; in practice, the "policy"
has only as much substantive content as courts choose to give it.a6
The "policy" might mean only that federal courts should respect
the ability of state courts to decide state law, an indisputable prop-
osition. For our purposes, however, we must decide whether this
"policy" requires respect for state court handling of federal con-
stitutional claims, a threshold question in determining whether
federal interim relief ought to be available in these cases. If respect
for state courts includes respect for the state courts' ability to
handle federal constitutional claims, then state courts should also
be able to determine the appropriateness of interim relief on those
claims.
Recently, the Supreme Court has held that great deference
is owed to state courts in situations somewhat analogous to, yet
distinguishable from, the Pullman37 abstention at issue here.38
In Younger v. Harris,3 9 it held that a federal court should not en-
join a pending state prosecution, except in extraordinary circum-
stances,40 even when the federal plaintiff asserts that the proceed-
ing violates federal constitutional rights. In post-Younger cases, the
Court has held that a district court should not issue a declaratory
judgment on the constitutionality of a law under which a pending
3- See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 443 (1971) (dissenting opinion,
Burger, C.J.); Norman v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 361 F. Supp. 1167, 1175 (M.D. Fla. 1973);
Bezanson, supra note 2, at 1131-32; Whitten, Federal Declaratory and Injunctive Interference with
State Court Proceedings: The Supreme Court and the Limits of Judicial Discretion, 53 N.C.L. REv.
591, 676-78 (1975); cf. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 600-01, 605-09 (1975) (state
courts may legitimately decide constitutional issues arising in civil litigation); Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (restraint of federal equity courts from interfering with state
prosecutions rooted in federalism and respect for state institutions); Bonner v. Circuit Ct.,
526 F.2d 1331, 1336 (8th Cir. 1975) (state judiciary fully competent to decide constitutional
questions); Bezanson, supra note 2, at 1121-27, 1135, 1139 (state courts sometimes provide
more reliable forum for deciding federal issues).
36 [T]he possibility of [federal-state] friction has not become an important factor in
defining the scope of the abstention doctrine [because] "friction" argues for dis-
Missal rather than abstention [and because] a "friction" analysis cannot be used to
limit the abstention doctrine; without a significant possibility of federal-state fric-
tion there may be no reason to dismiss a case, but abstention may still be proper.
Note, supra note 2, at 620.
31 Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
38 See note 2 supra.
39 401 U.S. 37 (197 1).
40 Such prosecutions may be enjoined only when they are brought in bad faith, for the
purpose of harassment, or in other extraordinary circumstances. Id. at 54.
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prosecution has been brought, 41 enjoin prosecutions brought after
a federal action is filed but before substantial proceedings on the
merits have taken place in federal court, 42 or enjoin civil proceed-
ings if they are related to enforcement of state criminal laws. 43
These cases are explained in part by the federal courts' tradi-
tional reluctance to interfere with criminal prosecutions. 44 But the
cases also rest on respect for the ability of state courts to decide
issues of federal constitutional law.45 Most recently, in Juidice v.
Vail,46 the Court significantly weakened its civil/criminal distinction,
extending the principles of Younger to state contempt proceedings
against a judgment debtor. While noting that a state's interest in
this context may not be as strong as its interest in criminal proceed-
ings, the Court recognized that "interference with the contempt
process not only 'unduly interfere[s] with the legitimate activities of
the State' . . . -but also 'can readily be interpreted "as reflecting
negatively upon the state courts' ability to enforce constitutional
principles." ' .47 The impact of this decision may be felt in Pullman
abstention cases as well. Implying that state courts are as competent
as federal courts to decide federal constitutional issues, the Court
established the basis for federal deference to state courts whenever
such issues are joined with unsettled state law questions. The ration-
ale of Juidice thus arguably undermines all federal interim relief.
III
THE COUNTERVAILING POLICY OF FEDERAL COURT
PROTECTION OF FEDERAL RIGHTS
Although theJuidice decision indicates a willingness to expand
the scope of Younger abstention, the Court once again refused to
abandon all limitations on that doctrine. The reason may be that
41 Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
42 Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
4' Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
44 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971); see Whitten, supra note 35, at 629-39.
45 See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 600-01, 605-09 (1975); Younger v. Har-
ris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971). The Younger line of cases has produced much commentary.
See, e.g., Maraist, Federal Intervention in State Criminal Proceedings: Dombrowski, Younger,
and Beyond, 50 TEX. L. REv. 1324 (1972); Whitten, supra note 35; Note, supra note 3.
46 97 S. Ct. 1211 (1977).
47 Id. at 1217-18 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971), and Huffman v.
Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 892, 604 (1975)). Nevertheless, the court refused to hold explicitly
that Younger applied to all civil litigation. 97 S. Ct. at 1218 n.13. See Trainor v. Hernandez,
97 S. Ct. 1911, 1919 n.8 (1977). See generally Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 607
(1975).
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the Court has recognized not only those state interests favoring
state court adjudication, but also countervailing considerations
favoring federal adjudication. In recent cases, the Court has held
that a person who is not the subject of a pending state proceeding
may bring a declaratory judgment action in order to test a law's
constitutionality, 48 and that a person who has not yet violated a
state law may obtain a preliminary injunction against its enforce-
ment during the pendency of his federal suit.49 Thus, the Court
has accommodated the principle that respect for state proceedings
requires deference with the principle that federal courts bear
primary responsibility for matters arising under federal law, in-
cluding adjudication of federal questions50 and protection of fed-
eral rights.51
This latter principle has received more attention where the
strong state interest in pending prosecutions is not a factor. Thus,
in Pullman-type cases, abstention should be ordered only for the
purpose of allowing state courts to determine state law, and not to
give state courts the power to decide federal constitutional ques-
tions.52 The federal court should retain jurisdiction in order to
protect the plaintiff's interests while the case remains in state
court53 so that the parties may return to it for resolution of the
federal issues. 54
Two distinct considerations underlie the principle that federal
courts bear primary responsibility for matters arising under federal
law. First, our system of federalism benefits from such an alloca-
tion of judicial power. Just as state courts are more familiar with
state law and more sensitive to state policy, so federal courts are
more familiar with federal law and policy. The federal judiciary is
48 Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462-65 (1974).
4 Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 930-31 (1975).
0 See, e.g., cases cited in note 6 supra.
51 See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 464, 473-74 (1974); Zwickler v. Koota, 389
U.S. 241, 251 (1967); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 488-91 (1965); Baggett v. Bul-
litt, 377 U.S. 360, 375-79 (1964); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 672-74 (1963);
Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 177-78 (1959); cf. American Trial Lawyers Ass'n v.
New Jersey Sup. Ct., 409 U.S. 467 (1973) (per curiam) (federal court abstention to permit
determination of state law issue, but jurisdiction retained to preserve federal claims).
52 See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415 (1964);
Field, supra note 2, at 1080 & n.34.
53 See American Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. New Jersey Sup. Ct., 409 U.S. 467 (1973) (per
curiam); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 179 (1959). See also Harris County Comm'rs
Ct. v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 88 & n.14 (1975).
" Both parties may agree to litigate federal questions in state court. See England v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415-19 (1964).
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likely to produce a more uniform body of federal law than fifty
state systems. 55 These concerns, however, appear irrelevant to the
question of interim relief. The federal court can decide federal
questions in a Pullman-type case whether or not interim relief is
granted.
The second consideration underlying the policy that federal
courts should have primary responsibility for deciding federal
questions is more relevant to the interim relief issue. Plaintiffs have
a legitimate interest in having a federal forum available to protect
federal rights. This plaintiff interest finds support in the tenure
and salary provisions of Article III, which aim to insure that fed-
eral judges remain faithful to the Constitution and free of execu-
tive and legislative influence;56 in many statements by the Supreme
Court that the federal courts are primarily responsible for the pro-
tection of federal rights;57 and in the existence of federal jurisdic-
tion over cases arising under federal law but presenting only ques-
tions of fact.58 Just as the independence and national outlook of
federal judges make them more sensitive to federal rights when
evaluating laws and finding facts, 59 those factors should also make
federal courts more sensitive to the plaintiff's federal rights when
deciding whether or not to grant interim relief. If the plaintiff is
forced to present his request for interim relief to the state court, he
is denied a federal forum for the protection of his claimed federal
right, even though the federal court remains available to decide
federal legal questions and associated questions of fact.
To summarize, interim relief can conflict with some of the
policies on which the abstention doctrine rests: However, the con-
flicts are far fewer than when courts refuse to abstain altogether.
Interim relief necessarily interferes with a state's program. Grant-
ing interim relief because of a court's evaluation of probable suc-
cess on the merits may conflict with policies favoring state court
55 See Mishkin, supra note 6, at 158-59.
56 See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 78, 79, 81, at 505-10 (A. Hamilton) (Belknap Press ed.
1961); cf. Note, supra note 2, at 608, 609-10 (life-tenured federal judges, rather than
periodically elected local judges, are likely to remain objective in emotionally-charged cases,
such as those involving civil rights). Presumably, familiarity with federal law and uniformity
of decision could be achieved without tenure and salary protection. As Hamilton argues,
those provisions are designed to assure that judges will not be pressured into favoring
government interests over individual rights.7 See, e.g., cases cited in note 51 supra.
58 See Mishkin, supra note 6, at 169-76.
59See Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1105 (1977); cf. HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 2, at 1051-53 (basis of diversity jurisdiction discussed).
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resolution of state issues and the avoidance of decision on constitu-
tional grounds. At the same time, however, granting such relief
would not show lack of respect for state court decisionmaking,
since federal courts bear the primary responsibility for protection
of federal rights. Federal courts do not offend state courts by doing
their duty.
IV
ALTERNATIVES TO INTERIM RELIEF
Given the conflict between the plaintiff's interest in federal
protection of his federal rights and the state interests harmed by
interim relief, one might expect the courts to develop standards for
granting preliminary injunctions in cases appropriate for absten-
tion but in which the plaintiff asserts that he will suffer irreparable
harm absent such relief. Although some courts have attempted to
establish such standards,6" most have ignored the possibility of
granting interim relief in these cases. Two other responses have
been more popular.
The Supreme Court has indicated that the harm to the plain-
tiff from delay should be considered as a factor in the decision to
abstain. Accordingly, some courts refuse to abstain when the delay
occasioned by abstention would unduly harm the plaintiff.61 Other
courts tend to view the presence of an unsettled issue of state law
as automatically triggering abstention, and refuse even to consider
the possibility of interim relief.62
"0 See cases cited in note 1 supra. These cases are discussed in Part V infra.
61 See, e.g., Harris County Comm'rs Ct. v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 83 (1975); Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 140 n.3 (1970); Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 537
(1965); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 491-92 (1965); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S.
360, 375-79 (1964); Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 329
(1964); Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 229 (1964); Daniel v. Waters, 515 F.2d
485, 492 (6th Cir. 1975); Mengelkoch v. Industrial Welfare Comm'n, 442 F.2d 1119, 1126-
27 (9th Cir. 1971); Long Island Vietnam Moratorium Comm. v. Cahn, 437 F.2d 344, 347
(2d Cir. 1970), aff'd mem., 418 U.S. 906 (1974); Rodos v. Michaelson, 396 F. Supp. 768, 776
(D.R.I.), rev'd on other grounds, 527 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1975); Dempsey v. McQueeny, 387 F.
Supp. 333, 339-40 (D.R.I. 1975); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v.
Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 766-67 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Marin v. University of P.R., 346 F.
Supp. 470, 478 (D.P.R. 1972); Midwest Video Corp. v. Campbell, 250 F. Supp. 158, 162-63
(D.N.M. 1965).
62 See, e.g., Neal v. Brim, 506 F.2d 6, 11 (5th Cir. 1975); First Am. Bank & Trust Co.
v. Ellwein, 474 F.2d 933, 934-35 (8th Cir. 1973) (by implication); Harris v. Samuels, 440
F.2d 748 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 832 (1971); Wymbs v. Republican State Exec.
Comm., 378 F. Supp. 1136 (S.D. Fla. 1974); Baker v. Baker, 368 F. Supp. 651, 652
(E.D.N.C. 1973); United Artists Corp. v. Proskin, 363 F. Supp. 406, 408-09 (N.D.N.Y
1973); Alwin Constr. Co. v. Lufkin, 360 F. Supp. 1119 (D. Conn. 1973); South Cutler Bay,
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A. Ignoring the Plaintiff's Harm From Delay
The latter approach, under which the court ignores the prob-
lem of delay, may be illustrated by three cases: Manard v. Miller,63
McMillan v. Board of Education,64 and United Artists Corp. v. Proskin.65
In Manard, college students attending school in Virginia claimed
that their right to register and to vote in their college communities
was violated by a statute that required prospective voters to prove
domicile. The district court granted a temporary restraining order
allowing the students to register provisionally pending resolution
of the case. Later the court decided to abstain. The reason for
abstention is unclear from the opinion. As the dissent notes, 66 state
law appeared clear. The court may have thought some ambiguity
existed, however, for it instructed the plaintiffs to attempt to regis-
ter and to appeal any adverse decisions in the state courts. Without
further explanation, the court dissolved its temporary restraining
order and voided the provisional registrations. The dissenting
judge disagreed with both the lifting of the temporary restraining
order and the decision to abstain. The dissent argued that the right
to vote was of "a fundamental nature, 67 and noted that the delay
caused by abstention could unnecessarily prejudice that right, since
the next election was imminent. The dissent also pointed out that
the cost to the state of allowing provisional voting by the plaintiffs68
was estimated to be $12,000. The substantive issues could be de-
cided and the validity of those votes determined before the winners
of the election took office. Because such a valuable right was at
stake, because the cost to the state was small, and because, in his
view, the plaintiffs had shown a likelihood of success on the merits,
the dissenting judge contended that provisional voting was ap-
propriate interim relief even if abstention were ordered. 69
United Artists Corp. v. Proskin70 is an analytically similar case.
The plaintiff wanted to enjoin the state from enforcing an obscen-
Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 349 F. Supp. 1205, 1208-09 (S.D. Fla. 1972); McMillan
v. Board of Educ., 331 F. Supp. 302, 310 (8.D.N.Y. 1971); Manard v. Miller, 53 F.R.D. 610
(E.D. Va. 1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 982 (1972); cf. Albertson v. Millard, 345 U.S. 242, 245
(1953) (dissolving temporary restraining order against enforcement of Michigan Com-
munist Control Act pending state court action).
63 53 F.R.D. 610 (E.D. Va. 1971), aff'd mer., 405 U.S. 982 (1972).
64 331 F. Supp. 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
65 363 F. Supp. 406 (N.D.N.Y. 1973).
66 53 F.R.D. at 613 (dissenting opinion, Merhige, J.).
67Id. at 614.
68 It appears that about 1,500 persons would have provisionally voted. See id. at 615.
69 Id. at 614.
70 363 F. Supp. 406 (N.D.N.Y. 1973).
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ity law against a planned exhibition of the movie, "Last Tango in
Paris." The court abstained on Pullman grounds, because state law
was unclear. Here, as in Manard, the court lifted a temporary re-
straining order and denied further preliminary relief without
weighing the interests at stake once the decision to abstain had
been made. Had the court treated the propriety of interim relief as
a separate issue, the plaintiff's first amendment rights would have
been given some weight. As it was, only the state interest in en-
forcement of the obscenity law, the federalism interest in state
court decision of state law questions, and the federal court interest
in avoiding constitutional adjudication received attention.
Some cases where the court abstains and denies interim relief
reach results that are hard to fault. McMillan v. Board of Education7'
is an example of an abstention case where a grant of interim relief
would have been inappropriate. The plaintiff there challenged the
constitutionality of a law that, under one construction, limited to
$2000 the amount a board of education could pay to a private
school for the education of a handicapped child. Since the statute
was ambiguous and no state court had yet construed it, the district
court abstained. The court denied motions for interim relief with
no further discussion. In this case a preliminary injunction might
have required the state to make an unexpected expenditure of
funds already allocated' to other state programs, thus upsetting the
state budgeting process. A court should be understandably reluc-
tant to issue an order causing a substantial disruption of state
programs before the plaintiff has proved the merits of his federal
cause of action.
What is most striking about Manard, United Artists, and similar
cases,7 2 is that before making- the decision to abstain the court
made a preliminary evaluation of the merits and granted a tem-
porary order, yet dissolved the order after abstaining.73 Thus, to
the extent that granting the temporary restraining order required
consideration of the case on the merits, abstention interests in
avoiding constitutional adjudication and promoting state court de-
cision of state law issues may already have been damaged before
the court lifted the temporary restraining order. Similarly, the
state's interest in continuing its program without interruption had
71 331 F. Supp. 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
72 E.g., Neal v. Brim, 506 F.2d 6, 9-11 (5th Cir. 1975); Harris v. Samuels, 440 F.2d
748, 752-53 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 832 (1971).
73 The criteria for granting a temporary restraining order are essentially the same as
those governing preliminary injunctions. See 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 17,
§ 2951, at 507-10.
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already been weighed in the balance against the plaintiff's interest
and had been found wanting.
Cases where the court has not yet granted interim relief are
less compelling. No evaluation of the merits and no weighing of
equities has taken place. Even so, the harm that might befall the
state's interests should be a factor in the balance and not a reason
for refusing to balance. A court should refuse relief only when
state interests outweigh the plaintiff's interest. In practice, how-
ever, the strength of the different interests varies with the case.
The voting registration question in Manard is a good example of a
case where the state's interest is slight in comparison with the
plaintiff's. United Artists may be a closer case if we assume the state's
interest in prohibiting arguably obscene movies is stronger than its
interest in spending $12,000 on provisional voting. The chief prob-
lem with the cases is not that the balance should have been struck
differently, but that the opinions do not show any consideration of
the plaintiffs' interests.
Judges who look only to abstention criteria seem to believe that
abstention is incompatible with interim relief. Only that premise
could support their reliance on abstention to deny an injunction.
But the premise is weak. Abstention rests on no hard and fast
rules. It is an equitable doctrine whose application lies in the sound
discretion of the district court.7 4 It is a means to achieve certain
goals. Although interim relief interferes with some goals served by
abstention, it advances other goals of the federal system. A blanket
rule against interim relief elevates abstention policies over the
principle that federal courts bear primary responsibility for protec-
tion of federal rights. The Supreme Court has never held that the
Constitution dictates such an ordering of policies.75
B. Consideration of Harm Caused by Delay in Making
the Abstention Decision
Other courts take the harm from delay into account in making
the abstention decision itself.7 6 Delay is generally recognized as the
74 See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941). See also Wright, The
Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 TEX. L. REv. 815 (1959).
7- In fact, it has at least twice approved the concept of interim relief, although without
discussing the issues raised in this Article. See Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 176-79
(1959); Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220, 226-28 (1957); cf. Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586-87 (1964) (district court properly declined to act until legislature
had had opportunity to adopt acceptable apportionment scheme) (discussed in note 101
infra).
76 See cases cited in note 61 supra.
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chief price paid for the benefits of abstention. 77 It seems reason-
able to conclude that the benefits should be foregone when the
costs are too high. But courts that follow this approach fail to see
that often interim relief can cut the costs of delay without forego-
ing many of the benefits of abstention.
Admittedly, interim relief is not always a solution to the prob-
lem of delay. In some cases, reaching the merits may be the only
way to protect the federal rights at stake. For example, in Baggett v.
Bullitt7 8 the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that two
Washington state statutes requiring teachers and other state em-
ployees to take oaths of allegiance as a condition of employment
were unconstitutional. The district court abstained from ruling on
one of the oaths because the state courts had never construed the
statute prescribing the oath. The Supreme Court held that absten-
tion was improper under the circumstances and declared the oath
unconstitutionally vague. In rejecting abstention, the Court distin-
guished two kinds of unsettled state law questions. On the one
hand were cases that "principally concerned the applicability of the
challenged statute to a certain person or a defined course of con-
duct, whose resolution in a particular manner would eliminate the
constitutional issue and terminate the litigation. '79 In such cases
abstention might be proper. The oath at issue in Baggett, however,
was "not open to one or a few interpretations, but to an indefinite
number. ' 80 A single adjudication could eliminate a small part of
the vagueness, but the plaintiffs would still be unable to define "the
range of activities in which they might engage in the future."' 81 For
example, the oath required a promise that the employee "will by
precept and example promote respect for the flag and the institu-
tions of the United States of America and the State of Washington,
reverence for law and order and undivided allegiance to the gov-
ernment of the United States. '82 A single adjudication could de-
termine only whether specific conduct, e.g., criticizing democratic
government, fell within the proscription, but not whether any
other action, such as refusing to salute the flag, was also pro-
scribed. The costs of continuous adjudication that abstention would
"See Field, supra note 2, at 1085-86, 1129-30; Note, supra note 2, at 606-07.
78 377 U.S. 360 (1964). See also Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 401 & n.5 (1974);
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 490-91 (1965).
79 377 U.S. at 376-77.
s
0 Id. at 378.
81 Id.
"IId. at 362 (quoting 1931 Wash. Laws ch. 103).
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entail were too high given the statutes' inhibition of first amend-
ment freedoms. Deciding the merits, rather than granting interim
relief, seems the appropriate response to the vagueness problem in
Baggett. Granting interim relief to an individual plaintiff does little
to remedy the harm from delay when many state adjudications
would be needed to fully eliminate constitutional questions.8 3
The delay issue has played a role in deciding whether to ab-
stain in cases raising no first amendment issues. In New York State
Association for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller,84 the plaintiffs
challenged on constitutional grounds the conditions at a state
school for the retarded. The court conceded that state law might
provide a sufficient remedy for the harms complained of, but
chose to reach "complex" constitutional questions anyway.85 The
court weighed "the importance of the right alleged to be impaired
and the harm inflicted by delay" against the abstention interest in
not "impinging on the federal-state relation. '86 Because abstention
would delay vindication of the patients' rights, and because during
the delay there was "a real probability of serious physical harm" to
the patients,87 the court refused to abstain.
The court could not easily have avoided the choice between
plaintiff and abstention interests posed in Retarded Children. Pre-
liminary relief would have caused serious dislocations in the state's
allocation of resources. Such dislocations are hard to justify without
a ruling on the merits. In cases of this sort, a court should abstain
entirely or decide the merits. The problem is to determine which
approach is better, and the answer may depend on the court's
evaluation of the competing interests. In Retarded Children, the
court's choice to decide on the merits is defensible, given the im-
minent danger to the patients.
Interim relief seems inappropriate in cases like Baggett and
Retarded Children. But courts also cite delay as a reason for reaching
the merits in cases where the delay caused by abstention is not
unusually great, and when the requested relief consists merely in
halting state interference with the plaintiff's activities. In Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc. ,88 for example, a company that harvested crops
in Arizona, but packed them in California, challenged Arizona's
8' See Bezanson, supra note 2, at 1142-44; Note, supra note 2, at 611-13.
84 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
85 Id. at 758, 766-68.
86 Id. at 766.
87 Id. at 767.
88 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
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attempt to force it to build a cannery in Arizona. Since the Arizona
officials intended to prevent the plaintiff from carrying its ripe
crops across the border unless the cannery was built, the crops
would have been lost absent quick relief. The Supreme Court said
that the "emergency situation" thus created helped to justify a re-
fusal to abstain, even though state law was unclear.8 9 By contrast,
in Reetz v. Bozanich, 90 an Alaska law restricting fishing deprived
plaintiff fishermen of their livelihood. The district court refused to
abstain on the ground that delay would irreparably harm the plain-
tiffs. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the delay was the
price the plaintiffs must pay to gain the benefits of abstention to
the federal system.91
V
INTERIM RELIEF: THE MIDDLE GROUND
In cases like Pike and Reetz, interim relief, rather than refusal
to abstain or abstention coupled with condolences for the plaintiff,
may offer courts the most appropriate response. Interim relief can
and should accommodate both the policies served by abstention
and the plaintiffs' interests in vindicating constitutional rights. In-
terim relief provides an ideal solution in cases where abstention
ought to occur but where plaintiffs' interests are also strong, for it
avoids completely ignoring one important interest. Moreover, in
the long run, use of interim relief should advance abstention
policies, for courts may feel freer to abstain if they can simultane-
ously protect the plaintiff during the delay.
Interim relief may also help achieve another goal. Vague ab-
stention standards and varying evaluation of plaintiff and state
interests have caused courts to reach inconsistent results on absten-
tion questions. Thus, in United Artists Corp. v. Harris,92 state courts
had already construed an obscenity statute, but recent Supreme
Court decisions had suggested that the statute might be unconstitu-
tional. The court abstained so that the state court could reconstrue
the statute in light of the Supreme Court opinions. 93 By contrast,
the court in Long Island Vietnam Moratorium Committee v. Cahn94
89 Id. at 140 n.3.
90 397 U.S. 82 (1970).
91 Id. at 86-87.
92 363 F. Supp. 857 (W.D. Okla. 1973).
93M. at 861-62.
94 437 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1970), aff'd mem., 418 U.S. 906 (1974).
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refused to give the state courts even a single chance to construe a
flag salute statute in striking it down as overbroad. 95 Interim relief
in such cases could eliminate the necessity for making stark value
choices and the inconsistencies that arise when courts value com-
peting interests differently. 96 Both United Artists and Moratorium
Committee provided good cases for interim relief coupled with ab-
stention.9 7 The federal courts could have protected the plaintiffs
while awaiting definitive state court interpretations around which
to frame informed constitutional inquiries.
A. Interim Relief in the Courts
Despite the attractions of interim relief, courts have refrained
from using it. A few cases, however, suggest its usefulness. The
Supreme Court has tacitly approved of interim relief in abstention
cases at least twice, and lower courts have occasionally used the
procedure. In Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States,98 Leiter, relying
on a state statute, brought suit in state court against the lessees of
mineral rights from the United States, claiming that it owned the
rights. The United States then brought suit in federal court to
quiet title to the mineral rights and to obtain a preliminary injunc-
tion against the state suit. The government argued that Leiter had
misconstrued the statute and that if Leiter's construction were cor-
rect, the statute would be unconstitutional. The Court held that the
district court should abstain to permit statutory construction in a
state court declaratory judgment action. In addition, it enjoined
the pending state proceeding in order to prevent the possibility of
inconsistent state and federal judgments.
Admittedly Leiter Minerals is an odd case. The federal govern-
ment is rarely a party in an abstention case, and the problem giving
rise to interim relief seldom involves the possibility of inconsistent
judgments but rather the harm caused the plaintiff by delayed
vindication of his federal rights. Even so, Leiter shows how such a
95 437 F.2d at 347-50.
96See generally Field, supra note 2, at 1135 n.167. Professor Field suspects that the
views of members of the Supreme Court on the merits may influence the degree of uncer-
tainty they demand of state law before they abstain. See also Field, The Abstention Doctrine
Today, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 590, 602 & nn.51, 52 (1977).
97 In United Artists itself the court separated the injunction issue from the abstention
issue and decided there was no irreparable harm. 363 F. Supp. at 861-63. The case points
out the different weight given to individual and state interests by different courts. The
United Artists court's rejection of interim relief reminds us that even if courts were more
sensitive to the possibility of reconciling individual and state interests, they would not al-
ways choose to do so.
98 352 U.S. 220 (1957).
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procedure can simultaneously advance several desirable goals: the
state courts decided the state law issue and the Court avoided a
constitutional question.99 The parties were neither required to liti-
gate two lawsuits at once nor forced to conform their conduct first
to a state judgment and then to a possibly inconsistent federal judg-
ment.
In Harrison v. NAACP 0 0 the Court abstained from ruling on
the constitutionality of Virginia statutes regulating legal activities of
the NAACP because the statutes had not yet been construed by the
state courts. But the Court recognized that enforcement could
jeopardize the NAACP's first amendment rights and cause "great
and immediate irreparable injury."''° The state had assured the
Court that it would not prosecute under the statutes until the state
litigation was finished. The Court said that if the promise were not
kept, "the District Court of course possesses ample authority in this
action, or in such supplemental proceedings as may be initiated, to
protect the [NAACP] while this case goes forward."' 0 2 Analytically,
this case is like Leiter and other injunction-plus-abstention cases, ex-
cept that here the state did voluntarily what it otherwise would
have been forced to do.
Lower courts, recognizing the advantages of interim relief
where both plaintiff interests and abstention interests are strong, 0 3
99 The case was ultimately dismissed as moot. United States v. Leiter Minerals, Inc.,
381 U.S. 413 (1965).
100 360 U.S. 167 (1959).
101 Id. at 178. The Court eventually struck down the statute. See NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415 (1963). In Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), the reapportionment case,
the Court again rerognized the value of interim relief, albeit not in the abstention context.
The district court had provisionally reapportioned the legislative districts in Alabama, but
had left to the legislature the task of drawing permanent lines. The district court retained
jurisdiction to review the legislative reapportionment. The Supreme Court commended
this procedure. See 377 U.S. at 586-87. Since the district court found the existing appor-
tionment unconstitutional before granting provisional relief, the case does not involve ab-
stention. But the state's interest in drawing district lines is akin to the state's abstention
interest in deciding unsettled issues of state law: "[Liegislative apportionment is primarily a
matter for legislative consideration and determination." 377 U.S. at 586. See also Bezanson,
supra note 2, at 1113 n.35 (discussing Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407 (1965)).
102 360 U.S. at 179. See also Baxter v. Ellington, 318 F. Supp. 1079, 1089 (E.D. Tenn.
1970); Silver v. Jordan, 263 F. Supp. 627, 629 (C.D. Cal. 1966), second complaint dismissed,
320 F. Supp. 1169 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Woodard v. Carteret County, 252 F. Supp. 268, 270
(E.D.N.C. 1966); Division 1287, Amal. Ass'n of Street Employees v. Dalton, 206 F. Supp.
629, 634 (W.D. Mo. 1962). These cases suggest that interim relief may be granted at a
future time if the circumstances warrant it.
103 In the Younger context, see The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REv. 47,
163-66 (1975), which suggests that the chief cost of Younger abstention is the inhibitory
effect of state proceedings on the exercise of first amendment rights by persons who have
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have used it in a variety of contexts: where the state sought (1) to
condemn the plaintiff's property; 10 4 (2) to discharge civil service
employees where damage to reputation was threatened; 10 5 (3) to
prevent a lawyer from representing a client in a pending suit;10 6
and (4) to bar a student from attending school until he had been
immunized, 07 or had cut his sideburns. 0 8 In other cases courts
have abstained and denied interim relief, but only after examining
the relief issue on its merits and being unpersuaded by the
plaintiff's arguments. 0 9 Thus, interim relief coupled with absten-
tion is not entirely unknown.
Courts that treat abstention and interim relief as separate is-
sues go a step beyond those that ignore any harm to the plaintiff
occasioned by abstention and those that consider such harm in
deciding the abstention question. But courts that have used or con-
sidered preliminary injunctions have not merely recognized that
the relief issue should be kept separate from the abstention issue.
Often they have treated the relief issue as though there were no
relation between interim relief and abstention, not recognizing that
injunctive relief can hurt abstention policies. Thus, their grants of
interim relief have been based on the plaintiff's risk of harm and
his chances for success on the merits. The only countervailing ab-
stention policy that courts have considered is the harm to the state
from interference with its program, a customary part of any in-
quiry into interim relief.
A more refined approach would separate the abstention and
relief issues, but consider the harm to abstention policies in decid-
not yet been arrested. It further suggests that this cost could be avoided and the state
interest in prosecution accommodated at the same time, if the federal court were to grant
an injunction against future nonjudicial enforcement of the statute until the constitutional
issue is settled.
104 Sherwood v. Bradford, 246 F. Supp. 550 (S.D. Cal. 1965).
105 Burks v. Perk, 339 F. Supp. 1194 (N.D. Ohio), rev'd, 470 F.2d 163 (6th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 905 (1973). The court of appeals thought the state law was clear and
constitutional. It also disapproved of federal interference in dealings between munic-
ipalities and their employees. The court did not directly attack the use of preliminary relief
in conjunction with abstention.
106 Silverman v. Browning, 359 F. Supp. 173 (D. Conn. 1972), aff'd mer., 411 U.S. 941
(1973).
107 Maier v. Good, 325 F. Supp. 1268 (N.D.N.Y. 1971).
108 Alexander v. Thompson, 313 F. Supp. 1389 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
109 See, e.g., Ament v. Kusper, 370 F. Supp. 65, 67-69 (N.D. Ill. 1974); N.D.D. Inc. v.
Faches, 367 F. Supp. 465, 467 (N.D. Iowa 1973); United Artists Corp. v. Harris, 363 F.
Supp. 857, 863 (W.D. Okla. 1973); MTW, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 327 F. Supp. 990,
992-93 (E.D. Wis.), supplemented, 330 F. Supp. 1281 (E.D. Wis. 1971); Silver v. Jordan, 263
F. Supp. 627, 629 (C.D. Cal. 1966), second complaint dismissed, 320 F. Supp. 1169 (C.D. Cal.
1970).
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ing the relief issue. The damage to abstention interests in granting
interim relief may be indirect and subtle, and may seem to weigh
lightly against a plaintiff's immediate and substantial interest in
avoiding irreparable harm. Even so, sensitivity to abstention in-
terests could change the result when the interim relief issue is
close, and should at least force courts to fully justify any grant of
relief.
A case illustrating clumsy use of the technique of combining
interim relief with abstention is Alexander v. Thompson.11O High
school authorities issued a dress code prohibiting students from
wearing sideburns below the ears. The plaintiff was suspended
from school when he violated the code. The district court abstained
but enjoined the authorities from keeping the student from attend-
ing school. The court questioned the constitutionality of the
suspension"' and recognized that the plaintiff would be greatly
harmed if he could not attend school until the case was finally
decided.'1 2 But most of the opinion was devoted to an analysis of
the unsettled state law issue of whether local authorities were au-
thorized to make such rules. After analyzing the state issue, the
court said: "When the California courts have an opportunity,
[section] 1052 of the Education Code predictably will be construed
in a manner consistent with the foregoing analysis and found want-
ing to support the sideburns regulations promulgated by defen-
dants."' 1 3 Later the court said: "A state court decision in this case
... will unquestionably do substantial justice and permit the plain-
tiff to obtain the relief he seeks here. 1 1 4 In short, the federal court
told the state court how to decide the case.
A more sensitive approach to the reconciliation of interim re-
lief and abstention interests may be found in Catrone v. Massa-
chusetts State Racing Commission.' 15 A race track owner sought to bar
Catrone, a horse trainer, from its race track on the basis of charges
of misconduct that had been brought, but not proven, against
him." 6 The court abstained because it was unclear under state law
whether Catrone could properly be barred from the track." 7 The
110 313 F. Supp. 1389 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
I Id. at 1399.
'12Id. at 1394-95.
"'Id. at 1397.
141d. at 1398.
... 535 F.2d 669 (1st Cir. 1976).
16 Id. at 670.
"
7 Id. at 671.
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court went on to grant a preliminary injunction permitting Catrone
to go to the track. Balancing interests, the court noted that
Catrone's livelihood was at stake and concluded that "[t]he burden
upon [the owner] of putting up with his presence at its race track
seems minimal compared with that 'upon Catrone if he is kept
out."118 The court briefly discussed the state law and constitutional
issues. Although it expressed no view on the state issue, the court
concluded there was "substantial likelihood" that Catrone would
win on the constitutional issue, but was quick to warn that it was
not deciding that issue. 119
B. The Need To Develop Standards for the Use of Interim Relief
The care with which the Catrone court handled the relief issue,
and the willingness of other courts to give interim relief without
making even a preliminary determination on the merits,120 may
indicate that these courts are aware of the potential conflict be-
tween interim relief and abstention policies. But if these courts
recognize the conflict, they do not say so in their opinions. As a
result, the question of how abstention should affect the interim
relief issue has received little attention. Some courts that recognize
that interim relief furnishes an alternative to decision on the ab-
stention issue seem to use a balancing test to determine the interim
relief question. On one scale they weigh the importance of the
rights asserted by plaintiffs and the harm done to them by delay
during state court adjudication. For example, a threat to the
plaintiff's livelihood or to his right to free exercise of religion
might weigh more heavily than the right to exhibit an arguably
obscene movie or the right to sell uninspected milk.12  The
plaintiff's interest is weighed against the harm that interim relief
would cause to the state program under attack. Thus, the state
118 Id. at 672.
119Id. at 671-72.
120 E.g., Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220 (1957); Reed v. Board of
Election Comm'rs, 459 F.2d 121 (1st Cir. 1972); Sherwood v. Bradford, 246 F. Supp. 550
(S.D. Cal. 1965). Other courts, however, have made preliminary determinations on the
merits. E.g., Catrone v. Massachusetts State Racing Comm'n, 535 F.2d 669, 672 (1st Cir.
1976); Alexander v. Thompson, 313 F. Supp. 1389 (C.D. Cal. 1970); cf. Glenwal Dev.
Corp. v. Schmidt, 336 F. Supp. 1079 (D.P.R. 1972) (abstention inappropriate where
plaintiff's constitutional rights clearly violated).
121 Compare Catrone v. Massachusetts State Racing Comm'n, 535 F.2d 669, 672 (1st Cir.
1976) and Maier v. Good, 325 F. Supp. 1268 (N.D.N.Y. 1971), with United Artists Corp. v.
Harris, 363 F. Supp. 857, 863 (W.D. Okla. 1973) and MTW, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 327
F. Supp. 990 (E.D. Wis.), supplemented, 330 F. Supp. 1281 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
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interest may not be so great when the only harm to the state is
delay in achieving some objective and not total frustration of the
objective itself, 2 ' or when an injunction could be granted to one
plaintiff and not a large group.
The factors these courts balance are the plaintiff and defen-
dant interests that must be weighed in any case where a prelimi-
nary injunction is sought. 123 These courts overlook the point that
the presence of abstention interests in avoiding unnecessary con-
stitutional decisionmaking and having state courts decide issues of
state law should affect the balance. These considerations, of course,
work against interim relief. If a balancing approach is adopted to
decide whether interim relief is appropriate in individual absten-
tion cases, these abstention interests should be weighed.
Balancing plaintiff, state, and abstention interests, however, is
not the only way to deal with the clash between those interests.
Upon considering the question of how abstention should affect
interim relief, courts may prefer a different approach. They may
decide that abstention policies are served well enough by absten-
tion itself, are at most tangentially harmed by interim relief, and
should receive no special consideration when the relief issue is
decided. Alternatively, they may believe abstention policies are so
important that interim relief should not be granted unless, say, the
circumstances permit such relief without a tentative determination
on the merits. Or they may prefer some other rule.
Just how the issue is handled depends on how courts value
plaintiff interests and abstention interests and how much damage
they believe interim relief does to abstention interests. For now it is
enough to suggest three conclusions: (1) that courts should be
more willing to consider interim relief in abstention cases; (2) that
courts considering interim relief should recognize its potential for
conflict with abstention policies; and (3) that courts should articu-
late principles to deal with that conflict. Hopefully, this Article will
contribute to all three goals.
CONCLUSION
This Article has tried to show that greater use of interim relief
in abstention cases would help courts to accommodate more in-
122 Thus, the state's interest in enforcing a criminal statute while a suit is pending may
be greater than its interest in condemning a piece of land for its future use. Compare
United Artists Corp. v. Harris, 363 F. Supp. 857 (W.D. Okla. 1973) and N.D.D. Inc. v.
Faches, 367 F. Supp. 465 (N.D. Iowa 1973), with Sherwood v. Bradford, 246 F. Supp. 550
(S.D. Cal. 1965).
123 See text accompanying note 17 supra.
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terests than they can when the only choice is between abstention
and reaching the merits. Essential to the analysis here is the pre-
mise that federal courts are primarily responsible not only for de-
ciding issues of federal law, but also for protecting federal rights.
In recent years the Supreme Court has shown increasing regard
for the abilities of state courts to safeguard federal rights.
124 If
state courts are deemed equally able to protect those rights, there is
little point in the federal court hearing the claim for interim relief
in an abstention case. The state court would be an equally accept-
able forum for decision of the interim relief issue. Continued ex-
pansion of the Younger doctrine could lead in that direction.
Such an expansion should not be presumed too quickly, how-
ever. The Court's holdings restricting federal interference in state
proceedings have been accompanied by other cases that provide the
careful plaintiff a way to assert his federal claim in federal court.'
25
The result is that federal courts remain available for constitutional
challenges to state statutes. Moreover, in the Pullman abstention
context the Court has recently reaffirmed the principle that the
federal courts are to retain jurisdiction to hear the federal issues in
the case.' 26 In light of these developments, and in light of the
Court's reliance in Younger situations on the presence of pending
cases in state court, it seems unlikely that the Court will overturn
the principle that federal courts bear primary responsibility for the
protection of federal rights in Pullman cases. If this prediction is
accurate, interim relief will continue to be a viable alternative in the
Pullman context.
124 See text accompanying notes 35-47 supra.
125 See text accompanying notes 48-49 supra. See also Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225
(1972) (Civil Rights Act held an express exception to the anti-injunction statute).
126 American Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. New Jersey Sup. Ct., 409 U.S. 467 (1973); Lake
Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 510 (1972).
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